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Abstract
In this paper we present a source transformation-based framework to support uniform testing and model checking of implicit-
invocation software systems. The framework includes a new domain-specific programming language, the Implicit-Invocation
Language (IIL), explicitly designed for directly expressing implicit-invocation software systems, and a set of formal rule-based
source transformation tools that allow automatic generation of both executable and formal verification artifacts. We provide details
of these transformation tools, evaluate the framework in practice, and discuss the benefits of formal automatic transformation in
this context. Our approach is designed not only to advance the state-of-the-art in validating implicit-invocation systems, but also
to further explore the use of automated source transformation as a uniform vehicle to assist in the implementation, validation and
verification of programming languages and software systems in general.
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1. Introduction
With the growing size and complexity of software systems, software verification and validation techniques such
as testing and model checking are increasingly important. While testing focuses on the actual behaviour of the
program, model checking focuses on its mathematical model. Testing and model checking are complementary: testing
is lightweight but incomplete, while model checking is heavyweight but complete.
A major problem with testing and model checking is that they require different software artifacts. In fact, there is
often a big semantic gap between the code artifacts that can be executed and tested and the modelling artifacts that
can be verified using model checkers. This gap must typically be bridged by hand with little tool support, leading
to a real possibility of errors and spurious results when the finite-state model does not correspond exactly to the
implemented software system. Corbett, Dwyer, et al. note that hand-constructed models are “expensive, prone to
errors, and difficult to optimize” [1]. The time required to convert artifacts by hand and the possibility of spurious
results can be greatly reduced using automated transformations.
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Fig. 1. Our transformational framework.
One kind of software system which is particularly difficult to validate is implicit invocation (II) or publish-subscribe
systems, which are increasingly popular as an integration mechanism for loosely coupled components in software
systems. II systems feature a lot of non-determinism due to the concurrent execution of components. This high degree
of non-determinism makes them particularly challenging to certify and hence a good proving ground for comparing
and combining software verification and validation methods such as testing and model checking.
In previous work we proposed a framework for the uniform testing and model checking of II systems [2,3] based
on an II model checking system originally developed by Garlan and Khersonsky [4,5] and extended by Bradbury and
Dingel [6]. Our framework leverages Garlan and Khersonsky’s XML intermediate representation for II systems and
its automated translation to finite state models checkable by the Cadence SMV model checker [7], which is a tool for
exploring the state space of a program to check formal properties such as freedom from deadlock. Our previous short
paper [2] focussed on the testing and model-checking framework itself. In this paper we concentrate on the details of
its implementation using source transformations.
At the core of our framework is the Implicit-Invocation Language (IIL), a new special-purpose language specifically
designed for expressing verifiable software systems that use the II architectural style. IIL is designed to address several
problems: the lack of explicit features for II in existing programming languages, leading to code that does not express
its real semantics well; the large gap between II code and its hand-created modelling representation, for example as
Garlan and Khersonsky’s XML representation; the lack of any convenient simulation and testing framework for II
systems; the lack of the ability to both test and model check II systems in a uniform and consistent manner; and the
lack of automated tools to assist in these processes.
We have chosen to implement IIL entirely using formal source transformations, both as an experiment in that
technique and in order to allow for the future possibility of formal verification of the translations to execution and
modelling artifacts themselves. One set of transformations provides the ability to execute and test IIL programs by
translation to the existing general concurrent programming language Turing Plus [8], while another set provides the
ability to verify and model check IIL programs by translation to the XML intermediate representation of Garlan and
Khersonsky’s II modelling method (Fig. 1).
In the remainder of this paper, we provide a quick overview of the II architectural style in Section 2 and
introduce the Implicit-Invocation Language (IIL) in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the programming, execution, and
verification artifacts of our transformational framework. In Section 5 we present the details of our automated source
transformations to both execution and modelling artifacts. We describe experience using our system to both test and
model check three II examples as well as discuss future directions for exploring the complementary relationship
between testing and model checking in Section 6. Finally, we discuss related work and draw conclusions in Sections 7
and 8.
2. II systems
II systems are characterized by six parameters: components, events, event-method bindings, an event delivery
policy, a shared state, and a concurrency model. Components in the system can announce events, which are the
primary method of communication between components. Upon receiving events from the components, the event
dispatcher sends the events out to all subscriber components that have requested to receive that particular type of
event.
The correspondence between announced events and the methods to be invoked in response to these announcements
is defined in the event-method bindings. Event-method bindings instruct the dispatcher where to send events. The
event delivery policy, a set of conditional delivery rules, instructs the dispatcher on when and how to send them.
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Fig. 2. The Set-Counter example in IIL (slightly elided due to space constraints).
II systems that we have studied include [6]: a Set-Counter example, in which one component stores elements in a set
and another keeps count of the number of elements; the Active Badge Location System (ABLS), an electronic tagging
alternative to pagers, in which different components issue requests, store information, and announce the location of
users; and the Unmanned Vehicle Control System (UVCS), in which vehicle components announce information such
as their movement plan, and other components monitor the movement to ensure that vehicles reach their destinations
without collision. All of these systems are specified and integrated using implicit invocation.
3. The Implicit-Invocation Language (IIL)
To help bridge the gaps between coding, testing and verifying implicit-invocation systems, we have designed the
special-purpose programming language IIL. IIL is explicitly designed to allow for the direct expression of implicit-
invocation semantics using custom syntax for II features and concepts on top of a Java-like core. In order to guarantee
that all programs can be executed and tested, only features that can be directly implemented or transformed to
simulated concurrent execution are included. In order to guarantee that all programs can be modelled, only language
features that can be directly represented or transformed to Garlan and Kershonsky’s XML intermediate modelling
language are included. Also, to attach verification closely to code, the properties to be verified are directly expressed
as part of the program.
As an illustrative example, Fig. 2 shows a standard implicit-invocation example, the Set-Counter system [9]
expressed in IIL. In order to express verifiable II systems directly, IIL includes the following special features:
component declarations, event declarations, announcement statements, a dispatcher declaration, delivery statements,
event-method bindings, and property declarations.
The Set-Counter system declares two components: a Set and a Counter. The Set component contains a set of
objects and the Counter component keeps count of the objects in the set. Fig. 2 shows the IIL representation of both
the Set and Counter components. All components in IIL can contain variables and methods.
The Set-Counter example declares four events. EnvAdd and EnvRemove are external or environment events, which
represent external behaviour affecting the II system. Their declarations give the event name and its announcement
properties. The other declared events Insert and Delete are local events, which give the event name and optional
data. Components in IIL use announce statements to send local events to the dispatcher. For example, an Insert
event is announced in the Add method of the Set component.
As well as components and events, an event dispatcher is declared. The dispatcher is responsible for event delivery
and defines the delivery policy. Environment events are delivered immediately, while local events are delivered
according to the policy using deliver statements. In our Set-Counter example, the delivery policy says that if there
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are more Insert events waiting to be delivered than Delete events, then an Insert event is delivered immediately
and a Delete event is delivered randomly, otherwise the opposite occurs.
Event-method bindings are needed to register the methods to the events for event delivery. For example, in the
Set-Counter example the EnvAdd event is bound to the Add method in the Set component s. That is, when an EnvAdd
event is announced, the Add method in s will be invoked.
IIL also allows for direct expression of the temporal logic property declarations to be verified for the program
using the model checking process. For example, the property AlwaysCatchesUp in the Set-Counter example says
that global variable setSize will always eventually equal the counter variable in the Counter component c.
4. II framework artifacts
Our transformational framework for running, testing and verifying IIL consists of three main types of artifacts:
• Programming/specification artifacts in IIL itself
• Execution/testing artifacts in the Turing Plus language
• Verification artifacts in the XML intermediate language and the SMV modelling language.
Programs are expressed entirely in IIL, then automatically transformed to Turing Plus [8] for execution and testing
and to the XML intermediate representation for modelling and SMV for verification. Because it is explicitly designed
to express II systems, IIL programs are very concise — up to ten times smaller than both the corresponding Turing
Plus implementations used for testing and the XML and SMV representations used for model checking.
4.1. Execution artifacts in Turing Plus
Execution and testing artifacts are derived from IIL using a formal source transformation to Turing Plus [8], which
is a general-purpose concurrent extension of the programming language Turing [10]. We decided to target Turing Plus
for execution of II systems because of its simple, general concurrency model and randomized simulation scheduling
framework, which allows for lightweight, realistic testing of concurrent programs.
A critical part of our transformation from IIL to Turing Plus is the design of a representation for implicit method
invocation and component concurrency in Turing Plus that accurately reflects IIL semantics. In designing these, we
used as a reference semantics for IIL the corresponding features of Garlan and Kershonsky’s XML notation for II
systems [4,5].
Turing Plus does not support implicit method invocation directly, so in our Turing Plus model we used explicit
invocation to implement implicit-invocation. Thus the Turing Plus implementation uses explicit method calls in event
announcement, in event delivery, and in components to invoke bound methods when a delivered event is received.
The concurrency model determines how to assign and manage threads in the system. Based on the Garlan and
Kershonsky modelling semantics, our implementation fixes the concurrency model to use a separate Turing Plus
thread for each component, the event dispatcher, and the system itself. To ensure that the execution semantics of
an IIL program in Turing Plus matches its model checking semantics in SMV, all of the threads in the Turing Plus
implementation of an II system are synchronized using barrier synchronization.
Structurally, the Turing Plus implementation consists of a module and nested monitor for each component
declaration and the dispatcher, and a main procedure that handles environment event generation. These vary with
system and are derived from the IIL program by source transformation.
The Turing Plus implementation is based on a set of common definitions for the underlying mechanisms of II
that are program independent, such as type definitions for events, event queues, and event warehouses (collections of
event queues), as well as modules to manage the system event warehouse, component event warehouses, and thread
synchronization. These modules are independent of the IIL program being transformed and are included from a library
using generated include directives in each transformed result.
4.2. Verification artifacts in SMV
To model check systems written in IIL, we use the approach previously presented in [6,4,5]. This approach
focuses on the automatic analysis of II by representing an II system in an XML intermediate representation and
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Fig. 3. Diagram showing how the parts of an IIL program are used in generating the corresponding Turing Plus program and SMV model.
using an existing Java tool to transform it into an SMV model accepted by the Cadence SMV model checker. The
challenge therefore was to create a source transformation for IIL programs to the limited features of the XML
modelling representation. As an alternative, we could have developed our own transformation from IIL to SMV
directly. However, since the XML representation had been used sucessfully in previous work and since many of the
limitations of the XML representation are a result of the underlying SMV language, we instead choose to build on the
previous work.
The SMV model for an IIL program represents each component and the dispatcher as an SMV module. There
is also a main module which instantiates the other components. Modules in SMV have input and output parameters
which are used for event announcement. For example, in the Set-Counter example an output parameter of the Set
component is connected to an input parameter of the Dispatcher for the announcement of an Add event, and an output
parameter of the Dispatcher is connected to an input parameter of the Counter component for delivery of the event.
The model checking semantics of the SMV program is (by design) identical to the execution semantics of the Turing
Plus program outlined above.
5. Transformations in the II framework
Now that we have introduced the artifacts involved in our framework, we can discuss TXL and our automated
transformation tools for artifact conversion. Fig. 3 shows an overall summary of how the parts of an IIL program
are used to automatically transform IIL programs into a Turing Plus program for execution and an SMV model for
verification.
5.1. Source transformation using TXL
TXL [11] is a programming language designed to support source transformation tasks. It combines features of both
functional and rule-based programming, and supports unification, implied iteration and deep pattern match. A TXL
program consists of two parts: a context-free, possibly ambiguous grammar describing the syntactic structure of the
artifacts to be transformed, and a set of by-example formal transformation rules that use pattern-replacement pairs to
describe the desired transformations. TXL has been used in a range of applications from software design recovery
to artificial intelligence, in both academic and industrial contexts [12]. Although we use TXL to express the source
transformations in our framework, our method does not depend on any particular tool, and other source transformation
languages and systems such as Stratego [13], ASF+SDF [14], ANTLR [15] and others have their own advantages and
could serve as well.
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Fig. 4. Generated Turing Plus module/monitor for the Set component of the Set-Counter example.
5.2. Transformation to execution artifacts
Our automated tool for transforming IIL to Turing Plus consists of a set of transformation rules written in TXL.
The structure and syntax of Turing Plus programs is very different from IIL — some of these differences have been
discussed in Section 4.1. The transformation to Turing Plus is divided into four steps: component transformation;
dispatcher transformation; system and environment setup generation; and restructuring of the resulting system body.
The fours steps form a tightly coupled transformation: each must be completely consistent with the other for the
combined result to be correct. In order to facilitate this consistency, each of the steps is derived by formal source
transformation from the same source artifact: the entire IIL source program itself. This demonstrates the advantages
of the main design goal of IIL: to capture all aspects of the II system in one uniform source artifact. Each step takes as
input the entire source program in IIL, using different parts of the source as needed to transform or generate its result.
Step 1: Component transformation. Component transformation combines information from the event declarations,
component declarations, and constructors in the IIL program. In Turing Plus, components are represented as modules
and the component transformation occurs in five parts. To clarify the component transformation, we refer to the Turing
Plus implementation of the Set component in Fig. 4, which was automatically transformed from the Set-Counter IIL
example in Fig. 2. For each part of the transformation, we make reference to the corresponding parts of Fig. 4.
First, module and monitor names for components in the Turing Plus program are generated from the component
names in IIL (lines 1, 8). Second, an event warehouse (a collection of event queues) is created for each type of event
that a component accepts (lines 4, 5). Third, each method in a component is added to the export list for its monitor
(line 9). This makes the methods public, so that they can be called from outside the monitor, for example in the run
process (line 48).
Fourth, the method bodies for each component are generated. In addition to the syntactic transformation of the
method bodies from IIL to Turing Plus, the invoking event must be retrieved (lines 45–48). A method requires the
retrieval of the invoking event in order to use data contained in the event. Since the information about the invoking
event is not included in the method body of the IIL program, we must extract this information from the remote
component instantiations and the event-method bindings during transformation.
Fifth, the run process (lines 42–51) needs to check each event queue and invoke the appropriate bound method if
the event queue is not empty. During transformation, the accepts statements in the IIL program are used to generate
the conditional expression of the if statement in the run process, and event-method binding information is used to
generate the method call.
As an example of the TXL transformation rules used in this step, Fig. 5 shows the main rule used to generate
the module and monitor structure from an IIL component. As is evident in this example, TXL’s by-example concrete
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Fig. 5. Main TXL Rule for generation of the Turing Plus module/monitor structure for an IIL component.
syntactic patterns and functional decomposition style help to make it convenient to express and validate our source
transformations.
Step 2: Dispatcher transformation. The dispatcher in Turing Plus is constructed using the event declarations,
the dispatcher declaration, and the system constructor of the IIL program. All of this remote information must be
combined using a global-to-local transformation to generate the result.
For each event in a system, the dispatcher creates a queue in the system event warehouse. Event queues are not
represented in the IIL program and are generated using the same method as described for component queues above.
The event delivery policy is translated directly from the dispatcher body of the IIL program into code for the Turing
Plus dispatcher module. In order to complete the event delivery transformation, we also need to use information from
the component instantiations and the event-method bindings.
Fig. 6 shows the result of generating the Dispatcher for the Set-Counter example. Random delivery is simulated
using the Turing Plus randint library routine to flip a coin. The main TXL rule to generate the Dispatcher module
from the dispatcher section of the IIL program is similar in form to the rule for components shown in Fig. 5.
Step 3: System and environment setup. In this step we generate declarations for global variables specified in the
IIL program and initialize system constants of the Turing Plus implementation. We incorporate the parts common
to all systems (discussed in Section 4.1) by generating file includes such as the include “rendezvous.i”, which adds
the module that handles barrier synchronization. Finally, we generate statements at the end of the program to fork a
concurrent process for each of the component and dispatcher modules.
Environment setup generates a procedure using a method call for each external event. An example TXL function
from this step is shown in Fig. 7. This function demonstrates the use of TXL’s functional control paradigm to
implement a source transformation that inherits global contextual information to generate its result — in this case, the
list of events passed in from the main system setup generation rule.
Step 4: System body re-ordering. Unlike IIL, Turing Plus is a declaration-before-use language, and Turing Plus
programs must follow a strict order and structure of declaration. In order to separate concerns and avoid overly
constraining transformation rules, the previous three transformation steps ignore these constraints. This leaves the
ordering problem to this last separate transformation, which involves reordering the program elements to match
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Fig. 6. Generated Turing Plus Dispatcher module for the Set-Counter example.
Fig. 7. TXL function to make the Turing Plus external event generator for an IIL program.
Fig. 8. Example TXL rule used in reordering generated Turing Plus code.
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the order in Fig. 3. In essence, this transformation is a topological sort of the program into declaration-before-use
dependency order. A simple TXL rule used in this step is shown in Fig. 8.
5.3. Transformation to verification artifacts
A major drawback of the model checking work that we presented in [6] was that it was not completely automated,
since user interaction was required to develop the XML modelling representation for the program. Our current
approach overcomes this deficiency and bridges the gap between artifacts by completely automating the process
of generating finite state models for software systems written in IIL.
The transformation from IIL to SMV finite state models involves three steps: program restructuring, conversion
to XML, and finite state machine translation. The first two steps convert IIL into the XML modelling notation using
cascaded TXL source transformations of the IIL program. The third step uses an existing Java tool to transform the
XML representation to a set of finite state machine models in SMV that can then be verified using the Cadence SMV
model checker.
Step 1: Program restructuring. The original goal of the IIL language was as a convenient replacement for the
verbose XML representation that would be easier to read, write and understand. In the end, IIL has evolved into a
full special-purpose language that includes many other notational conveniences, such as true global variables, local
variables in methods, for loops and switch statements, none of which are in the XML intermediate language. In this
first step of our modelling transformation, these notational conveniences are resolved, in essence by compiling and
reordering the IIL program using source transformation. The result is a simplified IIL program which is isomorphic
to its XML modelling language equivalent, but not yet in XML notation.
Three main language features of IIL are not present in the XML representation and must be converted. First, global
variable access is transformed to match the indirect global variable access of the XML representation. IIL components
have direct access to globals, while the XML representation uses the SMV model, in which global variables must be
accessed indirectly through special local input/output variables.
Second, IIL supports variable declaration at both the component and method level, while the XML modelling
representation allows variables at the component level only. This step involves moving all method level variables to
the component level. To avoid potential name clashes, method variables are uniquely renamed using the method name
as a prefix.
Third, IIL allows the convenience of switch statements in the dispatcher and both switch statements and for
loops in component methods, while the XML modelling representation has only if-then-else statements in order
to simplify its modelling task. The transformation therefore transforms switch statements into if-then-else and
unrolls for loops into statement sequences, using classic transformations borrowed from the compiler community.
Recall that, by design, IIL is restricted to expressing programs that have a modelling language equivalent — thus,
because the XML modelling representation does not have loops, IIL for loops are constant bounded and can always
be unrolled. Similarly, although the XML modelling representation has no switch statement, the transformation can
convert them to their if-then-else equivalents. The TXL rule for converting switch statements used in this stage
is shown in Fig. 9.
Finally, the program is restructured into the strict order required by the XML modelling representation. In IIL there
are no restrictions on ordering, but the XML representation must be strictly structured according to its schema. As
in the transformation to Turing Plus, we simplify the previous steps by implementing the ordering constraints as a
separate source transformation on the result.
Following this step, the IIL program has been restructured into a statement-by-statement match to the target XML
modelling representation, but has not yet been converted to XML. Again, rather than convert to XML tag notation
while restructuring the IIL program, we have separated the conversion to XML tags into a separate cascaded source
transformation in order to separate concerns. This cascaded transformation style is characteristic of complex TXL
transformations and has served us well in this project, as in others.
Step 2: Conversion to XML mark-up. The second step of the modeling transformation involves the syntactic
mapping of the simplified and reordered IIL program to XML notation. For example, consider an event-method
binding, defined in a bind statement, from Fig. 2:
bind Insert to c.CountIns(Insert.numElements);
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Fig. 9. TXL rule to convert ILL switch statements to if-then-else form.
Fig. 10. TXL rule to convert bind statements to XML mark-up form.
The bind statement causes an Insert event to invoke the CountIns method in the instance c of the Counter
component. In the XML intermediate representation, the bind statement is transformed into:
<event-binding event-name="Insert">
<method-binding instance-name="c" method-name="CountIns"/>
</event-binding>
The TXL rule for the XML mark-up translation of bind statements is shown in Fig. 10. The rule matches every IIL
bind statement and captures its event name and list of method invocations. The event name is quoted so that it can be
used in the XML tag, and a sequence of XML method-binding tags for the bound method invocations is generated by
the subrule construct method binding. The rule then replaces the bind statement by an XML tag with the event
name around the tagged sequence of method bindings.
Step 3: Generation of finite state machines. Following the transformation from IIL to the XML modelling notation,
we use the Java tool developed by Garlan and Khersonsky [4] (modified in [6]) to transform the XML representation
of the program into a set of finite state machines in SMV. These can then be checked using the Cadence SMV model
checker to verify the property constraints declared in the IIL program.
Fig. 11 shows the Set-Counter system in SMV. In the example, we see the definitions of the Insert and Delete
event type (lines 1, 2) as well as the definition of four modules: Set (lines 4, 5), Counter (lines 7, 8), Dispatcher
(lines 10–12), and main (lines 14–67). The Set and Counter components communicate with the Dispatcher
component using input and output parameters. For example, announce Insert (line 4) is an output parameter of
the Set component.
The main component serves three purposes. First, it is the source of all environment events. For example,
announcement of the EnvAdd and EnvRemove events is defined by the ComponentConsistency assertion (lines
57–63) which is assumed to be true. ComponentConsistency describes the behavior of the environment events
using temporal logic. Specifically, it states that EnvAdd will eventually be announced by the Dispatcher and that
eventually it will always not be announced (i.e., eventually it will never be announced again).
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Fig. 11. The Set-Counter example in SMV (elided due to space constraints).
Second, the main module declares all of the local variables required for component communication and maps
them to the corresponding modules through module instantiation. For example, theSet out announce Insert is
a local variable that serves as an output parameter of theSet (lines 43, 44), an instantiation of the Set module.
The parameters of the instantiation modules are connected together via local variable assignments. For example
(line 49),
evtDispatcher_in_theSet_announce_Insert := theSet_out_announce_Insert
maps an output parameter of theSet module instance to an input parameter of evtDispatcher.
Third, the main module contains all of the properties that we will verify using the Cadence SMV model checker
(lines 65, 66). Additional details of this step can be found in [6,4,5].
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(a) Set-Counter System. (b) Active Badge Location System (ABLS).
(c) Unmanned Vehicle Control System (UVCS).
Fig. 12. System structure for example II systems.
5.4. Evaluation of transformations
To evaluate our framework, we used the three examples introduced in Section 2: the Set-Counter System, the Active
Badge Location System (ABLS) and theUnmanned Vehicle Control System (UVCS). For each example, our evaluation
involved programming the system in the IIL language and verifying (by hand) that our transformation tools from IIL
to Turing Plus and from IIL to the XML representation performed correctly. We demonstrated that the semantics
was well preserved across all of the transformations by checking that the execution behaviour (i.e., execution traces)
and the model checking behaviour (i.e., counter-example traces) matched the original design semantics of the IIL
programs. Finally, we verified that the specified properties of the IIL programs held, both empirically and formally,
by testing and model checking the results of our transformations (described in Section 6.2).
Up to this point we have primarily described our transformations in the context of the simplest example: the Set-
Counter System. We will now provide more detail on the two real-world examples: ABLS and UVCS.
ABLS. Our IIL program for ABLS consists of three kinds of components: request workstation(s), a main workstation,
and sensor workstation(s) (Fig. 12(b)). In addition to these components, the ABLS system also interacts with Active
Badges which are carried by all people in the range of the system. Active Badges communicate directly with the
sensor workstations via sensors and are not considered part of the IIL program.
Request workstations randomly issue the following events: Find an Active Badge’s location, determine which other
badges an Active Badge is With, Look at one location and return all of the badges that are there, Notify an Active
Badge holder via an audible or vibration notification, and obtain a History location report of an Active Badge.
The main workstation has three primary responsibilities: information retrieval, information storage, and command
execution. Information about the location of Active Badges is received by polling the sensor workstations (sending a
Poll event and receiving back PollRequest events from all sensor workstations).
Information received from sensor workstations on the current and previous locations of Active Badges is stored
in a database. Events from the request workstations are received and fulfilled using information in the database.
H. Zhang et al. / Science of Computer Programming 62 (2006) 209–227 221
Fig. 13. Example transformation of Request Workstation component in ABLS from IIL to Turing Plus and IIL to SMV.
For example, a FindResult event is sent in response to receiving a Find event. The sensor workstations are only
responsible for sending polling results to the main workstation whenever a polling event is received.
A partial example of the transformation of the ABLS IIL program is presented in Fig. 13. In the example, the
request workstation is transformed into Turing Plus using the TXL rules described in Step 1 of the IIL to Turing Plus
transformation (Section 5.2). This example is similar to the transformation of the Set component discussed previously.
The request workstation is also transformed into an SMV module using the TXL rules described in Section 5.3 to go
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from IIL to XML and using our modified version of the Garlan and Khersonsky Java tool to go from XML to SMV. In
SMV, the behaviour of a component is modelled using case statements which define next values based on the current
state of the component. Due to space restrictions, not all of the SMV code for the request workstation is shown in
Fig. 13.
UVCS. The UVCS IIL program has four kinds of components: vehicles, regions, visualizer(s), and rules injector(s).
Vehicle components contain information including the identity, long-term goal, rule version, and position of the
corresponding vehicle. A vehicle component is also responsible for transmitting the identity, position, rule version, and
short-term plan to other interested components by announcing a VehicleInfo event. Region components collect data
on all vehicles in their region by receiving VehicleInfo events. This information is compiled to create a summary of
information which is announced as a RegionInfo event. The visualizer component gathers the summary information
from all regions and displays it externally. The visualizer also has the ability to zoom in on a region process by
receiving events from vehicle components.
To avoid collisions, the system supports a set of traffic rules to govern the movement of vehicles. The version of the
rules being used can be updated by the rules injector component, which publishes new rules via event announcement
of the RulesInfo event. Vehicle components usually subscribe to these events and listen for new versions of the
traffic rules. To avoid rule version conflict in the case of a possible collision, vehicles announce the version of the
rules they are using along with their short-term plan. If a collision is possible, the traffic rules are used to decide which
vehicle should wait. In case vehicles are using different rule versions, a default rule is used instead.
In our IIL representation of this system, there is one visualizer component, one rules injector component, at least
one region component, and possibly multiple vehicle components. Fig. 12(c) is a generalized representation of the
UVCS that shows the components of the system and their event-based communication. The transformation of the IIL
program to Turing Plus and SMV was also used to evaluate our transformation framework. The UVCS is more than
twice as large as either of the previously described examples, which unfortunately makes it infeasible to show any
meaningful IIL, Turing Plus, or SMV code for it here.
6. Testing and model checking using the II framework
We have discussed the programming, execution and verification artifacts and the automated transformations used
in our framework. We now detail how the framework can be used in both testing and model checking.
6.1. Testing
Our first transformation converts an IIL program into a semantically equivalent Turing Plus program which can
then be compiled using the Turing Plus compiler and concurrency library to an executable program. The result of
executing this Turing Plus program is the production of an execution trace. For the purposes of validation, we used
manual code instrumentation in the Turing Plus program to output run-time information into the traces. For example,
we can see partial execution traces for each of our three examples in Fig. 14.
In these examples, we have as output the clock tick, the name of each announced event, and the new values of
updated global and local variables. Consider the Set-Counter trace in Fig. 14(a) from clock tick 56 to clock tick 59.
The trace shows an announcement of the EnvRemove event by the environment, which causes the number of elements
in the set (the variable setSize) to be decreased. The Set component then announces a Delete event which is
delivered to the Counter component, causing the counter variable to be decreased.
We have used execution traces to perform standard non-deterministic testing on all three of our concurrent example
II systems. Specifically, because Turing Plus uses a randomized simulation scheduler, multiple executions of the same
program with the same inputs generally result in different execution traces, allowing for bulk testing of many different
concurrent executions. Moreover, our Turing Plus programs are convenient for testing, because the test harness for
environment events is generated automatically as part of our transformation. We discuss our testing results further in
Section 6.2 when we compare them with our model checking results.
6.2. Model checking
Our second automated transformation converts IIL programs to the XML modelling representation and then to
SMV finite state models for formal verification. We have verified a variety of liveness and safety properties in the
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(a) Set-Counter execution. (b) ABLS execution. (c) UVCS execution.
Fig. 14. Partial execution traces of Turing Plus code.
context of our IIL examples. IIL currently allows for the expression of properties written in Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL), although we also have the ability to check Computational Tree Logic (CTL). The LTL operators used in the
expression of properties are: X φ (in the next state, φ holds), G φ (φ holds globally), F φ (φ holds eventually), and φ1
U φ2 (φ1 holds at least until φ2 does). Detailed results of our model checking experiments have been presented in a
previous paper [6]. In what follows, we highlight some of these results and discuss them in comparison to our testing
results for the same systems.
Set-Counter model checking. In the Set-Counter System, we verified three properties including AlwaysCatchesUp,
which determines if the number of items in the set will eventually be equal to the value stored in the counter (G F
(setSize = c.counter)). We verified this property using several different delivery policies, including one in which
all events are delivered immediately (property verified to true), and others in which some event types are delivered
randomly. For a given Set-Counter System with a particular delivery policy, we both verify the results and check them
against all of the execution traces of the Turing Plus program.
For example, in Fig. 14(a) we can see that, after each change in the value of the variable setSize, the Insert or
Delete is announced by the Set component and delivered to the Counter component where the variable counter
is updated to reflect the change in the set. In this case, there does not appear to be any violations of the property
AlwaysCatchesUp. Note that the more execution traces we generate, the higher our confidence that the corresponding
model checking result is correct.
ABLS model checking. In the ABLS, the properties that we verified include:
• Event delivery guarantees:We want to determine the number of transitions required for the request workstation to
receive a result from a command such as Find. The FindCorrectnessImmediate property checks if the value in the
master workstation database is equivalent to the value received by the request workstation in a FindResult event.
Additionally, FindCorrectnessInNextState and FindCorrectnessInTwoStates test to see if the value currently in the
master workstation database is equivalent to the value received by the request workstation in the next state and in
two states.
• Multiple event correctness: The FindLookCorrectness property examines the situation where the master
workstation component sends the results of a Find event in one state and then sends the results of a Look event in
the next state. Our property involves a Find on Badge 2 and a Look on Location 1. We verify two specific cases
to determine correctness: Badge 2 is at Location 1 and no badge is at Location 1. In the case where Badge 2 is at
Location 1, we verify that the location returned in the FindResult event will be 1 and badgesAtLocation in
the LookResult event will return true, indicating that at least one badge is in Location 1. In the case where no
badge is at Location 1, we verify that the FindResult event will not return 1 as the location for Badge 2 and
badgesAtLocation will be false.
224 H. Zhang et al. / Science of Computer Programming 62 (2006) 209–227
Table 1
Analysis results of ABLS system
Property Results
Policy 1 Policy 2
FindCorrectnessImmediate False False
FindCorrectnessInNextState False True
FindCorrectnessInTwoStates False False
FindLookCorrectness False True
Table 2
Analysis results of UVCS system
Property Results
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3
ruleVersionCurrentandConsistentAlways False False True
vehicleMovementCorrectness True True True
collisonAvoidanceGuaranteed False True False
longTermGoalAchieved True True True
Table 1 presents analysis results for the above properties using two different delivery policies. Policy 1 involves
using immediate delivery for all events related to polling (Poll, PollResult) and using a random delivery for
all events related to command requests (Find, FindResult, Look, LookResult). Policy 2 is similar, except that
polling events are delivered randomly and command requests are delivered immediately. We are interested in these
two policies in order to determine a priority for event types.
In our model checking, we achieved the same verification results for Policy 1 and Policy 2, except that Policy 2 can
provide guarantees on the properties FindCorrectnessInNextState and FindLookCorrectness. In our ABLS program,
using Policy 2 it takes exactly one state transition for the request workstation to receive the Find command results
from the dispatcher. In other words, we can guarantee that the location information received in a FindResult event
is equal to the location in the master workstation database exactly one state ago.
In Fig. 14(b) we see a partial execution trace that confirms that, using Policy 2, the FindResult event is
received one clock tick after it is announced. This execution trace also provides a counter-example to the properties
FindCorrectnessImmediate and FindCorrectnessInTwoStates. In conclusion, based on the results of both model
checking and testing Policy 2 provides a better event type priority and is the appropriate choice for the ABLS system.
UVCS model checking. The properties that we verified for the UVCS include:
• ruleVersionCurrentandConsistentAlways: This property verifies that, within UVCS with five vehicles, all of the
rules versions used by the vehicles are equivalent to each other and are equal to the current version.
• vehicleMovementCorrectness: This property is used to ensure that, when a vehicle moves from one region to
another, the change is handled correctly.
• collisonAvoidanceGuaranteed: This safety property verifies that two vehicles moving in the same region will never
crash:
G (~(Vehicle1.currRegion = Vehicle2.currRegion)
| ~(Vehicle1.xpos = Vehicle2.xpos)
| ~(Vehicle1.ypos = Vehicle2.ypos))
• longTermGoalAchieved: This liveness property verifies that a vehicle will reach its long term goal:
F ((Vehicle1.currRegion = Vehicle1.destRegion)
& (Vehicle1.xpos = Vehicle1.destxpos)
& (Vehicle1.ypos = Vehicle1.destypos))
We verified the above properties using three different delivery policies (see Table 2 for verification results). The
goal of this analysis was to determine which of the delivery policies, when used, will cause the system properties to
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hold. We used iterative model checking to determine an appropriate delivery policy. An interesting result of verifying
the properties for the different delivery policies is that it turned out that the properties collisionAvoidanceGuaranteed
and ruleVersionCurrentandConsistentAlways conflict.
Upon reaching such a conflict, our Turing Plus test results provide an ideal method for confirming the analysis in
actual execution. Fig. 14(c) shows a partial execution trace instrumented to output event announcement information
and local variable values related to our properties. The partial trace is related to Policy 3 and shows an instance where
the property ruleVersionCurrentandConsistentAlways is not violated. Due to these analysis results, the requirements
for the UVCS had to be weakened. We discuss several solutions to this conflict in [6].
6.3. Future directions
Although the design purpose of our IIL language and transformational framework is the comparison and
exploration of the synergy between testing and verification, thus far we have primarily evaluated testing and model
checking independently. Next we plan to use our framework to explore the relationship between testing and model
checking. We believe that it provides a good testbed for studying the synergies between these two verification and
validation methods, and in particular can allow us to investigate questions such as the following.
To what extent can testing be used to increase confidence in model checking results and in the correctness of the
model checker? One possibility which we have already been exploring is that, for a given LTL or CTL property, we
can generate and analyze execution traces to ensure that the traces do not violate the property. This type of check
would provide confidence that a verified property does not conflict with the behavior of the real system.
Conversely, for a given execution trace, we could represent the trace as a CTL property and use model checking
to verify that the trace is also possible in the model. For example, we could represent the partial execution trace in
Fig. 14(a) using the following CTL fragment. In the property fragment, EXφ means that along at least one path, in the
next state, φ holds:
...(EX EnvRemove & (EX SetSize=1
& (EX Delete & (EX counter=1
& (EX EnvAdd & (EnvRemove & ...
Might it be useful to integrate temporal logic properties into the testing effort through, for instance, run-time safety
analysis? One possibility would be to use safety specifications of a program to automatically generate a run-time
monitor. For example, safety properties could be used to generate a monitor that checks if a finite execution trace
satisfies the property [16]. This type of run-time monitor could also be used to increase confidence in model checking.
How can testing be used to simplify or optimize model checking? One of the primary optimizations in model
checking is decomposition. Testing could be used to identify parts of the system that can safely be abstracted or
removed in the context of model checking a particular property. For example, if a component is not used in a test
trace, it may be safe to remove it for the verification. The abstraction would take place at the IIL level, thus allowing
for us to check the testing and model checking results of the abstracted program against the original testing results.
Can model checking be used to evaluate the coverage offered by a test suite? Model checking could be used to
guarantee output coverage in black-box testing. For a given variable, we could verify that the variable will always take
on one of a set of values that covers the outputs. For example, if we wanted to know if a variable output could be 10
when the program is done, we could analyze the system with respect to the following property to see if it is true. In
the property, EFφ means that along at least one path, in some future state, φ holds. Moreover, done is true if and only
if the program has terminated.
EF (done & output=10)
Alternatively, we could model check the negation of the above property and possibly get a counter example with
information about input values that would cause the output variable to be 10 upon program termination.
Model checking could also provide guarantees in white-box testing. For example, if we wanted to provide statement
coverage for an IIL program, we could instrument the program to include a program counter whose values would
be recorded in the execution trace produced by Turing Plus. If we noticed that certain statements were not being
covered, we could determine that they are unreachable. This could be done by using the model checker to verify that
the program counter is never set to the statements in question. If this is true, we can be more certain that we have
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statement coverage. If it is false and a counter-example is provided, we can use the counter-example to determine
input values that would cause the execution of the statements. Furthermore, we could also use model checking for
branch coverage. This would be similar to statement coverage, except that we would need to model check if it is
possible for the system to reach a state in which the program counter has a particular value and a branch condition is
true.
How good is model checking at finding program bugs in comparison to testing? This question attempts to determine
the difference between the quantity of bugs found, the types of bugs found, and the efficiency of bug detection in model
checking vs. testing. One way to address this question is to use a technique such as mutation [17] to create versions
of a program that each contain a seeded syntactic fault. Mutation testing is a well-known comparative technique for
comparing different test suites and can be generalized to mutation analysis where test suites can be compared to
properties verified in formal analysis tools such as model checkers.
Mutation analysis could be used to compare how good model checking is at finding bugs in IIL programs in
comparison to execution using Turing Plus. For example, in the Remove() method of the Set component from our
Set-Counter System, we could apply the following mutation:
if ((setSize-value) >= -1) // > has been changed to >=
{ ... }
We can then both test and model check the mutated version of the Set-Counter System and compare the results to the
original program to determine if any differences were observed. A difference would indicate that the bug has been
detected. We are currently addressing this question in a separate research project [18].
7. Related work
Rapide [19] and Eventua [20] are other special-purpose languages for event-based systems. Rapide is an executable
architecture definition language intended for modeling the architectures of concurrent and distributed systems. A
Rapide program can include the specification of different components within the language or can be connected to
implementations written in standard programming languages. Eventua is an object-oriented language that includes
native support for events. Eventua programs can be transformed to the %$ς -calculus for execution. Our work differs
from these approaches in that we focus on formal analysis in addition to execution traces.
As an alternative to using a special purpose language, it would be interesting to explore using Java to represent
event-based systems (e.g. using the Message-Driven Thread API for Java [21], or publish/subscribe infrastructures
like Elvin [22] or Siena [23]). Our IIL work differs from this work, because we express implicit invocation semantics
and verification conditions in custom syntax rather than through library calls. Through the use of a single uniform
notation, the program, its execution and modelling are encoded much more directly.
Furthermore, if we did explore using Java to represent event-based systems, we could leverage existing work on
testing and model checking of Java programs. On the one hand, we could test the Java programs using an existing
approach to testing concurrent Java [24]. On the other hand, we could use the model checker Bogor [25] (with the
Bandera plugin [1]) to provide automatic translation and analysis. Our model checking approach differs in that we
achieve all our results using formal source transformation rules which, at least in theory, allow for formal verification
of the translations themselves.
Other existing work has proposed using formal source transformation to bridge gaps between verification and
practice. In our own previous research we used formal source transformation to extend the capabilities of the VeriSoft
C++ model checker to handle Java RMI verification [26], and at Microsoft Research formal source transformation
has been used to transform concurrent device drivers to sequential approximations that can be checked for some
concurrency properties using sequential model checking [27].
8. Conclusion
We have presented a uniform source transformation-based framework for specifying, testing, and model checking
implicit-invocation (II) systems, and demonstrated its efficacy on one test and two real-world examples. Our
framework consists of IIL, a special-purpose high-level language for specifying II systems, and two fully automatic,
formally specified source translations: one to the Turing Plus language for execution and testing, and one to the input
language of a standard model checker for verification. The framework demonstrates how formal source transformation
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can be used to combine the convenience of a special-purpose language with the benefits of two complementary quality
assurance techniques: testing and model checking. Furthermore, it shows how the significant gaps between artifacts
can be bridged using transformation. Automatic source translation makes the analysis in our framework less error
prone, less time consuming and more reliable.
The contribution of our work lies not only in the development of the transformation framework but also in
the opportunities for future research. The framework provides an excellent testbed for exploring both automated
transformation and the synergies between testing and model checking.
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